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Abstract 
 
Based on a matched sample of Japanese small firms and main banks, we 
investigate bank-firm relationships in the early 2000s. We obtain some remarkable new 
findings. First, small firms have multiple bank relationships even though they have their 
main bank relations. Second, firms tied with financially weak main banks increase their 
number of bank relations to diversify liquidity risk. Third, the duration of a main bank 
relation has a positive effect on the number of bank relations. This is interpreted as 
either a reputation effect or firms’ counterbalance actions against the monopoly power 
of main banks. To go further into this issue, we examine the effects of a main bank 
relation on the design of loan contracts. We find that firms with fewer bank relations 
tend to pledge personal guarantees to their main banks and are charged a higher interest 
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 1. Introduction 
Diamond (1984) demonstrates that the cost of the information production of 
financial intermediation is minimized by delegating the information production to a 
single bank rather than direct monitoring by individual investors, since the bank can 
reuse information technology. Interpreting the delegated monitoring argument from the 
point of view of borrowers, it is optimal for a firm to borrow from one bank to avoid 
duplicating information production.   
In Japan, main banks have played the role of delegated monitors and supplied 
loans to their affiliated firms. The information of affiliated firms is accumulated in main 
banks by way of multiple long-term transactions. Moreover, main banks have provided 
affiliated firms with a variety of services besides loans. Main banks are often delegated 
to collect bills as well as settle bills payable and give customers professional advice on 
financial affairs, production and investment plans. Main bank employees often hold 
managerial positions in sometimes financially troubled client firms for the purpose of 
direct monitoring.
1  
However, there are also costs to a single bank relation. In the course of single loan, 
the borrower’s information is exclusively accumulated into this single bank, which leads 
to an information monopoly. An information monopoly enables banks to extract rents 
from borrowers. For example, main banks sometimes charge a higher loan interest rate. 
In fact, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) obtain evidence that the cost of capital for firms 
with a close bank relation is higher than that for their peers. The information lock-in 
effect also makes it difficult for firms to switch lenders.
2 This is well known as the 
hold-up problem. One solution to this problem is to engage in multiple bank 
relationships.  
There is another factor that prompts firms to establish multiple bank relations. 
Massive bad loans and a subsequent shortage of equity capital in the late 1990s to the 
early 2000s plunged a number of Japanese financial institutions into financial 
                                                 
1  Hoshi et al. (1991) obtain evidence that the firms affiliated with a main bank enjoy a 
lower external finance premium than independent firms using micro data of firms. 
2  See Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) for a theoretical analysis of the association of 
banking relations with an information monopoly.   
 difficulties. Faced with poor main bank health, affiliated firms have incentives to 
diversify loan transactions with other banks to reduce liquidity risk. Therefore it is 
interesting to see how bank-firm relations in Japan changed in the midst of financial 
turmoil of the late 1990s to the early 2000s. This study is an empirical attempt along 
this line and examines whether Japanese small and medium-sized firms (SMEs 
hereafter) with main bank relations relied upon these multiple bank relations, and if so, 
why.
3  
Our study has several features. First, we use a unique micro data set of small and 
medium-sized firms called Survey of the Corporate Financial Environment (abbreviated 
as SCFE). The survey has been conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
of Japan since 2001. The questionnaire contains a number of interesting issues on 
bank-firm relations such as the number of bank relations, the name of the main bank 
with which the firm is affiliated, and the duration of the main bank relationship. This 
enables us to construct a matched sample of main banks and client firms. Based on this 
matched sample, we investigate how a main bank's health affects the number of bank 
relations of its affiliated firms.   
Secondly, we investigate how serious the hold-up problem is for firms tied to main 
banks. The SCFE has qualitative information on the strength of main bank relations, 
such as whether firms disclose their information to the main bank or whether they 
pledge for collateral or a personal guarantee. This information is useful in measuring the 
extent to which the main bank exploits its client as an information monopolist.
4 
Let us summarize our main findings. We find that firms with longer relations with 
their main banks have more relations with other banks. A firm whose main bank has a 
low capital ratio increases the number of relations with other banks. It is more likely 
that firms pledge personal guarantees when firms have longer relations with their main 
banks, and disclose information to their main banks, and the number of banks with 
                                                 
3  Ogawa et al. (2007) examine the determinants of multiple bank relationships for large 
listed firms. Uchida et al. (2006) examine the effect of bank size on the strength of 
bank-firm relationships, which, among other things, is measured by the number of bank 
relations. They use the same data set as ours, but only the 2002 survey.   
4  Ono and Uesugi (2005) also examine the role of collateral and personal guarantees in 
bank-firm relationships using the SCFE. Their study relies on cross sectional data from 
the 2002 survey but ours are panel data from 2001 to 2003.         which the firms have relations at all is smaller. Our evidence suggests that even the 
SMEs indeed diversified liquidity risk in the period of financial turbulence in the late 
1990s to the early 2000s by increasing transactions with other banks. We also confirm 
that there is dark side of the main bank system: the hold-up problem for SMEs. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the characteristics of the data 
set we use and shows a variety of descriptive statistics on bank-firm relations. Section 3 
sets up an empirical model to determine the multiple bank relationships and examines 
the impact of main bank relations on loan contracts. Section 4 presents estimation 
results, followed by interpretations of the results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes 
this paper.   
 
2. Data Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of Bank-Firm Relationships   
The SCFE, conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of Japan, is the 
first micro survey to ask small and medium-sized firms a number of questions regarding 
bank-firm relations. In each wave of the survey, a questionnaire is sent to about 15,000 
firms, mainly SMEs, of which about 7,000 to 9,000 firms respond.   
Since our interest lies in multiple bank relations in cases where a firm has contact 
with a main bank, we show some descriptive statistics on this issue. The sample period 
covers the years 2001 to 2003. First, we can compute the fraction of firms that have a 
main bank relationship. In the survey, a main bank is defined as the financial institution 
which the firm perceives to be the “main bank,” irrespective of the loan shares.
5 Table  1 
shows the fraction of firms that have a main bank relationship. More than 90% of the 
firms have a link with a main bank. Table 2 shows the type of main banks of the 
sampled firms. About half of the main banks are regional banks, and one-third is in the 
class of large banks, such as city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. The 
fraction of shinkin banks or credit cooperatives as a main bank is just 12-15%. Figure 1 
shows the histogram of the length of main bank relations of firms in 2002, measured in 
years. It is obvious that SMEs have longstanding relations with their main banks: the 
average length of a main bank relation is 26.4 years.   
                                                 
5  The firms are asked to choose only one bank as their main bank, so that there are no 
multiple main banks by survey design. Judging from the average length of a main bank relation, it appears that SMEs have 
longstanding close ties with their main banks. But SMEs have multiple bank 
relationships, too. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the number of bank 
relationships. The average number of bank relationships was 3.47 in 2003 to 5.12 in 
2002 and the median number was 3 in 2001 and 2003 to 4 in 2002 for firms with a main 
bank relation. This number is as large as that for the firms without main bank. Firms 
have multiple relationships with both large banks and regional banks. It should be noted 
that the median is rather low compared to Japanese large listed firms. In fact, Ogawa et 
al. (2007) report that the median number of bank relations is 6 to 7 for Japanese listed 
firms for the period of 1981 to 1999. 
Three variables on the terms of loan contracts with a main bank are available in the 
SCFE. The first is whether firms pledge collateral to their main bank, and the second 
one is whether firms pledge personal guarantees to their main bank.
6  Table 4 shows the 
fraction of firms that pledge collateral or personal guarantees to their main bank. The 
table shows that more than 70% of the firms pledge either collateral or personal 
guarantees to their main bank irrespective of the sample year. The third variable is the 
short-term interest rate of borrowings from a main bank. Figure 2 shows the histogram 
of the short-term interest rate in 2002. It should be noted that the distribution of the 
short-term interest rate is skewed to the right and thus the high interest rate relative to 
its mean is charged on some firms, reflecting risk premium. 
In the subsequent analysis we pick the firms in the SCFE with information on 
bank-firm relations available for the entire period of 2001 to 2003. This sample consists 
of 2138 firms in total. We further choose the firms that satisfy the following conditions. 
First, we select firms with a main bank that is a private bank: city bank, long-term credit 
bank, regional bank, shinkin bank or credit cooperative. Second, the firm has a 
bank-firm relation with the main bank in 2002 for two years or more.
7 Thus our panel 
data is unbalanced and the final number of firm-year observations is 5166. Table 5 
shows descriptive statistics of the major variables in our panel data set. For all variables 
                                                 
6  A personal guarantee is defined as a contractual obligation of the firm owner or other 
parties to repay the principal in case of default.   
7  We can identify the main bank of the sampled firms in the SCFE only in 2002, so that 
the firms of which the length of the main bank relation is less than two years are 
excluded since we cannot identify their main banks in 2001 or 2003.   but the debt-asset ratio, the mean value is larger than the median, indicating that the 
frequency distribution is skewed to the right. The large standard deviations also imply 
that the frequency distributions have a wide dispersion. 
For our sampled firms, the information on bank-firm relations in the SCFE is 
combined with the balance sheet information as well as the profit-loss statements of the 
TSR (Tokyo Shoko Research) database. Moreover, we can make use of the financial 
statements of the main bank itself as well, so we now have a matched sample of 
borrowers and main banks. 
 
3. Determinants of Multiple Bank Relations and the Impact of Main Bank Relations on 
Loan Contracts 
The number of bank relations is basically determined by the interplay between the 
demand for and supply of loan contracts. In this section we derive a reduced form 
equation of multiple bank relations. We also specify a reduced form equation of the 
terms of loan contracts, personal guarantee, and interest rate to gauge the effects of main 
bank relations on the design of loan contracts. 
 
Determinants of Multiple Bank Relations under the Main Bank System 
Why does a firm closely tied with its main bank have multiple bank relations? To 
find a clue to this question, it is important to understand why main bank financing is so 
prevalent. A main bank holds a large share of loans of affiliated firms, which gives a 
strong incentive to collect information about firms’ prospects and to monitor the firms. 
It helps to mitigate problems due to asymmetric information that lead to adverse 
selection and/or moral hazard. The studies of Kaplan and Minton (1994), Sheard 
(1994a), Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997), Miyajima (1998), and Morck and 
Nakamura (1999) provide evidence that main banks closely monitor their client firms 
and dispatch directors to them in the event of financial distress. Close monitoring also 
helps to identify the types of distress their clients face and thus reduce the cost of 
distress (Hoshi et al., 1990, and Sheard, 1994b). However, it should be noted that 
concentration of information about client firms by a main bank is a double-edged sword 
and creates monopoly exploitation, also known as the hold-up problem.   Thus, one important determinant of a multiple bank relation is the extent of the 
severity of the hold-up problem for the firm. If a main bank relation is not affected by 
heavy competition, a main bank might consider using the acquired private corporate 
information to extract rents, thus distorting entrepreneurial incentives and causing 
inefficient investment choices. The firm affiliated with the main bank might increase the 
number of bank relationships in order to act against this exploitation. Thus it is natural 
to include a variable to measure the degree of the hold-up problem in explaining the 
number of bank relations to cover this. We choose the length of a main bank 
relationship, measured by the number of years (MYEAR). It should be noted that this 
variable plays another role in explaining the number of bank relations. Since the 
information of the client firm is accumulated in the main bank in the course of making 
loans, the news that the main bank has a long and stable relationship with the client firm 
signals that the firm is a good one in terms of profitability, sales growth, financial 
conditions, and so on. Then other banks might judge the quality of the firm from the 
news and start business with the firm without investing much in gathering information 
about the firm. 
This is quite similar to cases where a firm’s stock price rises when good news 
about the relationship with its main bank is revealed to the market.
8  It is also similar to 
a sequential complementarity between bank loans and public debt financing. It is only 
after borrowers are exposed to strict monitoring by banks that firms can raise funds in 
the capital market. In our context the firm earns a good reputation after long and strict 
monitoring by the main bank, which attracts outside banks granting new loans to the 
firm.
9 
Another incentive for the firm with a main bank to have multiple bank relations is 
insurance against lack of liquidity. Suppose that a firm has a long-term profitable project. 
If that project is liquidated prematurely at the refinancing stage, the firm will incur a 
tremendous loss. That might happen if the main bank cannot roll over its initial loan and 
the firm in liquidity need has to apply for loans from non-relation banks (arm’s-length 
                                                 
8 For the announcement effect of bank loans on stock prices there are numerous event 
studies. For example, see James (1987), Billett et al. (1995), and Shockley and Thakor 
(1998).   
9  For complementarity between bank loans and public debt, see Diamond (1991) and 
Hoshi et al. (1993), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). financiers). These banks probably think that the applying firms have ‘lemon’ projects. 
To avoid this disastrous situation, the firm might have multiple bank relations and 
diversify its liquidity risk. Detragiache et al. (2000) present a theoretical model in which 
multiple banking can reduce liquidity risk. In the early stages of financing a project, a 
main bank acquires private information about the continuation value of the project. At 
the refinancing stage the firm might need to borrow from non-main banks due to 
unexpected liquidity shocks on the main bank that make it difficult to roll over initial 
loans. In the worst case, where the firm faces a severe adverse selection problem, the 
firm is unable to refinance the project by getting loans from other banks. Thus it will be 
profitable for the firm to establish multiple relations, since it reduces the probability of 
early liquidation. This model is applicable to the late 1990s to the early 2000s in Japan 
when banks suffered from massive non-performing loans and the banks’ balance sheets 
deteriorated severely. To test this conjecture, we include the balance sheet variables of 
banks as explanatory variables in explaining the number of bank relations. We choose 
two variables: the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (BADLOAN) and the 
equity capital ratio of the bank. The Basel Accord states that banks engaged in 
international business should keep the capital ratio above 8% and domestic banks 
should maintain 4% capital base at minimum. Therefore we construct two capital ratio 
variables. The CAPITAL1 variable stands for the capital ratio for the main bank engaged 
in international business, while the CAPITAL2 variable stands for the capital ratio for a 
domestic main bank. 
Lastly we incorporate the type of main bank to give additional information on the 
bank-firm relation. Consider a firm whose main bank is a city bank. In general city 
banks are large in terms of deposits, equity capital and total assets, so that they can 
mitigate the impact of liquidity shocks on lending activities. In this case, firms affiliated 
with a city bank may prefer a single relation with a main bank since a stable loan supply 
from the main bank is to be expected in the future. It implies that the firm with a city 
bank as its main bank will have a lower number of bank relations. However, the 
opposite may occur for the following reason. The news that the main bank of a firm is a 
city bank induces other banks to lend to the firm, anticipating that the main bank will 
bail out its affiliated firm in financial distress. Moreover, the too-big-to-fail principle of 
the policy authority justifies lending to the firm affiliated with a city bank. To sum up, the effect of bank type on the number of bank relations is ambiguous a priori. In order to 
estimate the effects of “bank type” on the number of bank relations, we include two 
dummy variables for the type of main bank: DCITY for city, long-term credit, and trust 
banks, and DREGION for regional banks. 
We also include conventional explanatory variables to determine the number of 
bank relations.
10  They are the debt-asset ratio (DEBTR), the ratio of operating profits to 
sales (PROFITSL), the ratio of liquid assets (cash, deposits and securities) to total assets 
(LIQAST), the ratio of land asset to total assets (LNDAST), and the logarithm of total 
assets (LASSET). The debt-asset ratio measures the effect of a firm’s capital structure on 
the number of bank relations. A large debt-asset ratio may increase the probability of 
multiple bank relations because the probability of default is likely to be higher for more 
leveraged firms and the adverse selection problem is more severe. Profitability of a firm, 
measured by the PROFITSL variable, will have a positive effect on the number of bank 
relations, and a liquidity-rich firm does not need additional bank loans, thus leading to a 
lower number of bank relations. The ratio of land to total assets, the proxy of the 
collateral size, has a positive effect on the number of bank relations, since having 
abundant collateral assets will attract non-relation banks. The effect of firm size on the 
number of bank relations is measured by the logarithm of total assets of the firm. The 
industry dummies (DIND1-DIND26) as well as the year dummies (YEAR1, YEAR2) are 
also included in the regression.
11 
12 
The equation to determine the number of bank relationships is given by:   
 
                                                 
10  There are numerous empirical studies on the number of bank relationships. For 
example, see Ongena and Smith (2000a, 2000b) and Volpin (2000) for international 
evidence on multiple bank relationships. Horiuchi (1993) and Horiuchi (1994) present a 
descriptive analysis of multiple bank relations of Japanese firms. 
11  The SCFE records industry code to which each sample firm belongs.   
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where  it NBANK : number of bank relationships for the i-th firm in period t 
 
In Equation (1) we take account of nonlinear effects of the capital ratio on the 
number of bank relations. As the capital ratio of a main bank approaches the lower 
bound of the capital requirement, the affiliated firm may accelerate transactions with 
other banks for fear that its main bank might stop providing loans. 
 
Impact of a Main Bank Relationship on the Loan Contract Terms 
When a firm’s main bank is the sole supplier of loans, the main bank accumulates 
proprietary information on the firm and might take advantage of its information 
monopoly. The terms of loan contracts are written so that they are favorable to the main 
bank. For example, the main bank might charge a higher loan interest rate or demand 
personal guarantees to secure monopoly rents. However, as the number of bank 
relations increases, the borrower gains more bargaining power and the terms of loan 
contracts become more favorable to the borrower. In other words, the severity of the 
hold-up problem will be reflected in the terms of the loan contract.   
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following equations that associate the terms 
of a loan contract with main bank relation variables. The terms of the loan contract are 
measured by two variables: a binary variable of whether a borrower pledges personal 
guarantees to its main bank (GUARANT equals 1 if borrower pledges personal 
guarantees, and 0 otherwise), and the short-term interest rate charged by its main bank 
(INTRATE).
13 We include three explanatory variables that represent a main bank 
relation. First, the bargaining power of the borrower is measured by the number of bank 
                                                 
13  Pledging collateral to a main bank is also useful information to gauge the impact of 
information monopoly on the terms of loan contract. However, information of collateral 
is not available in the 2003 SCFE.   relations (NBANK) examined above. More bank relations increase the bargaining power 
of the borrower, which decreases the probability that the borrower pledges personal 
guarantees. The borrower will also face a lower interest rate. Second, the extent to 
which a borrower is informationally exploited is measured by the length of a main bank 
relation measured in years (MYEAR). The longer the main bank relationship is, the more 
likely a borrower pledges personal guarantees and the borrower will face a higher 
interest rate. The third description is a binary variable whether the firm discloses 
information about the firm’s balance sheet, profit-loss statement and other situations 
surrounding the firm to its main bank (DINFORM equals 1 if a main bank is informed, 
and 0 if otherwise).   
We also include the variables of firm attributes as well as main bank attributes. As 
for the firm and main bank attributes, we use the same explanatory variables of the 
above equation to determine the number of bank relations. We include two additional 
variables to represent the lending attitudes of the main bank toward the firm. One is a 
dummy variable (DINCREASE) that takes 1 if the firm is asked to borrow more than 
applied for, and 0 if otherwise. The other is a dummy variable (DREJECT) that takes 1 
if the loan application by the firm is rejected or reduced by its main bank.
14 
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The short-term interest rate equation is similar to Equation (2) except that we substitute 
GUARANT for INTRATE and add the GUARANT variable to the explanatory variables 
to estimate the effects of personal guarantees on the short-term interest rate. 
                                                 
14  26 Industry dummy variables (DINDJ) as well as year dummies (DYEAR) are also 
included as explanatory variables.    
4. Estimation Results and Their Implications to Main Bank Relationship   
Determinants of Multiple Bank Relationships under the Main Bank System 
The number of bank relationships takes positive integers, so we apply two 
estimation models for count data: a Poisson random-effects model where a gamma 
distribution is assumed for random firm-specific effects, and a negative binomial 
random-effects model wherein it is assumed that the dispersion parameter is a random 
variable with a beta distribution.
15 We measure the number of bank relations in two 
different ways. One is the total number of bank relationships (NBANK1), including 
borrowings from non-banks, insurance companies, and public financial institutions. The 
other is one that excludes public financial institutions (NBANK2). Estimation of the 
number of bank relations including and excluding public financial institutions may yield 
different results because public financial institutions for SMEs may have business with 
firms by different motives.   
We first show the estimation results with NBANK1 as the number of bank relations. 
The first column of Table 6 shows the result of the Poisson model and the second 
column shows the results obtained with the negative binomial model. The length of 
main bank relation (MYEAR) has a positive effect on the number of bank relations and 
is significant at the 10% level in the Poisson model. This result can be interpreted in two 
different ways. In one interpretation the length of a main bank relation is taken as the 
extent of the severity of the hold-up problem. The longer the main bank relation is, the 
more severe the hold-up problem is, so that the main bank extracts a monopoly rent 
from the affiliated firm. To prevent informational exploitation, the firm increases the 
number of bank relations. The other interpretation takes the length of a main bank 
relationship as an indicator of reputation of the firm gained through close monitoring by 
the main bank. It reveals that the affiliated firm has a good record of business, which 
makes other banks think the firm worth lending to. For the time being we do not have 
enough evidence to distinguish between the two interpretations, but we will come back 
to this point later. 
                                                 
15  See Hausman et al. (1984) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for details on the 
estimation of a count data model in a panel data setting. As for the effects of the main bank health on the number of bank relations, the 
capital ratio of the main bank has a significantly negative effect on the number of bank 
relations of the affiliated firms, irrespective of the estimation model. It implies that a 
firm whose main bank has a low capital ratio increases the number of bank relations and 
that the effect gets larger as the capital ratio approaches the minimum level. In the late 
1990s to the early 2000s, the capital ratio of Japanese banks deteriorated rapidly and 
induced the affiliated firms to diversify liquidity risk by increasing transactions with 
other banks. 
We also have significantly positive effects of the city bank dummy on the number 
of bank relations. The news that a firm has a tie with a city bank as its main bank sends 
a signal that the main bank is large enough to bail out the affiliated firm in financial 
distress backed up by the policy authority, which in turn induces other banks to lend to 
the firm.   
The other variables have anticipated effects on the number of bank relations. The 
firm size, measured by the logarithm of total assets, and the debt-asset ratio have 
significantly positive effects on the number of bank relations, while the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets has significantly negative effects on the number of bank relations.   
As for the case with NBANK2 as the number of bank relations, the estimation 
results, shown in Table 7, remain unaltered. The length of a main bank relationship has 
a positive effect on the number of bank relations, and main bank health has a negative 
effect on the number of bank relations, as stated before. 
 
Impact of Main Bank Relationship on Loan Contracts 
To examine the effect of a main bank relation on the terms of loan contracts, we 
estimate the following two equations. One is a regression to relate the main bank 
relation to the GUARANT variable, which takes 1 if a borrower pledges personal 
guarantees to its main bank. We apply the probit random-effects model to estimate 
Equation (2).
16 The estimation results of Equation (2) are shown in Table 8. The first 
column corresponds to the estimation result with the total number of bank relationships 
measured by NBANK1. All the variables of a main bank relation (NBANK, NYEAR, 
                                                 
16  For the probit random-effects model, the likelihood is expressed as an integral which 
is computed using a Gauss-Hermite quadrature. DINFORM) exert a significant effect on whether firms pledge personal guarantees to 
their main banks. The firms with longer relations with their main banks and a smaller 
number of bank relations are more likely to pledge personal guarantees to their main 
banks. Moreover, the firms disclosing information to their main banks are more likely to 
pledge personal guarantees. This indicates that a main bank can take a strong stand on 
the terms of loan contract by making its affiliated firm pledge personal guarantees when 
the main bank has accumulated information on the client firm in the course of a long 
relationship and the client firm has fewer banks on which to rely. In other words, a main 
bank extracts monopoly rents from its affiliated firms. 
We also obtain interesting findings on the effects of other explanatory variables on 
whether firms pledge personal guarantees to their main banks. It is more likely that 
smaller firms with a higher debt-asset ratio pledge personal guarantees to their main 
bank. Smaller banks, such as shinkin banks and credit cooperatives, are more likely to 
demand personal guarantees from their client firms in loan contracts.
17 The estimation 
results are essentially unaltered when the total number of bank relationships is measured 
by NBANK2 (the second column of Table 8). Note that the coefficient estimate of the 
total number of bank relations is almost doubled in absolute value. It implies that the 
firms with fewer numbers of private bank relations are more likely to pledge personal 
guarantees, which appears consistent with the informational position monopoly by the 
main bank. 
The other equation relates the main bank relationship, including the GUARANT 
variable, to the short-term interest rate charged by the main bank (INTRATE). The 
estimation results are shown in Table 9.
18 The first column of Table 9 corresponds to 
the estimation results with the total number of bank relations measured by NBANK1. 
Here we also find that the main bank extracts rents from its affiliated firms in a 
relatively weak position. That is to say, main banks charge a higher short-term interest 
rate to the client firms that disclose their information and pledge personal guarantees to 
their main bank. The effects of the DINFORMT and GUARANT variables on the 
                                                 
17  Some coefficient estimates are hard to interpret. For example, a main bank with a 
higher bad loan ratio is less likely to take personal guarantees in a loan contract, and a 
firm with abundant liquidity is more likely to pledge personal guarantees. 
18  We apply the random-effects GLS model to the short-term interest rate equation so 
that it is consistent with the personal guarantee equation.   short-term interest rate are also significantly positive when the total number of bank 
relationships is measured by NBANK2, which is shown in the second column of Table 9. 
However the effect of the number of bank relations on the short-term interest rate differs 
between the two cases. When the number of bank relations is confined to private 
financial institutions, it has a significantly negative effect on the short-term interest rate. 
However, once the public financial institutions are taken into consideration, it is no 
longer significant. This evidence lends further support to our findings that firms face a 
hold-up problem. It is because public financial institutions are less likely to offer a high 
interest rate in order to extract monopoly rent, and thus inclusion of public financial 
institutions in the number of bank relations makes the association of the short-term 
interest rate with informational monopoly less clear.   
Lastly, note that the level of the short-term interest rate is also dependent on the 
firm characteristics as well as bank characteristics. A higher short-term interest rate is 
charged for smaller firms with a high debt-asset ratio and high profitability. Smaller 
banks with a high bad loan ratio tend to charge higher short-term interest rates to their 
client firms.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this study we constructed a matched sample of firms and their main banks by 
combining a unique micro survey of SMEs collected by the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency of Japan with financial statements of firms and banks. Based on the 
matched sample, we investigated the bank-firm relations of SMEs in the presence of a 
main bank as dominant lender in the early 2000s when Japanese banks were burdened 
with massive non-performing loans. We obtain new findings on the bank-firm relations 
of SMEs. After confirming that SMEs have multiple bank relations even when the firms 
have a main bank, we examined the determinants of multiple bank relations. Among 
other things, we found that firms tied with a financially weak main bank increased their 
number of bank relationships to diversify liquidity risk. We also found that the length of 
a main bank relationship had positive effects on the number of bank relations. This is 
interpreted as either the influence of a reputation effect of client firms or firms’ 
counterbalance actions against the monopoly power of main bank. To go further into this issue, we examined the determinants of personal guarantee pledges in loan contracts 
and the short-term interest rate charged by the main bank. It was found that firms with 
fewer bank relations that disclosed their private information to their main banks were 
more likely to pledge personal guarantees to their main bank and were charged a higher 
short-term interest rate. Our evidence lends support to the prevalence of the hold-up 
problem, and thus we may conclude that main banks extract rents from their client 
firms. 
It is often argued that relationship banking is important for SMEs. It is true that 
relationship banking can mitigate asymmetry of information between a main bank and 
client firms that leads to inefficient loan allocation due to adverse selection and the 
lemon problem, but it must also be borne in mind that too much concentration of 
information in one bank creates another hold-up problem, and monopoly rents earned 
by main banks also distort firms’ resource allocation.   References 
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Reply to the Question: Do You Have Your “Main Bank” ? 
 
(Percentages) 
   2001  2002  2003 
(1) Yes  95.6  94.4  92.6 
(2) No  4.4  5.6  7.4 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Survey of the Corporate Financial 
Environment, 2001, 2002, 2003. 
 
 
Table 2   
Main Bank by Type of Financial Institutions   
               
(Percentages) 
   2001 2002  2003 
(1)  City banks, long-term 
credit banks and trust banks 
34.9 33.7 28.9 
(2)  Regional banks and second-tier
regional banks 
49.6 51.6 53.5 
(3)  Shinkin banks and credit 
cooperatives 
12.4 11.7 15.2 
(4) Public  financial  institutions  2.3 2.1  1.8 
(5) Others  0.8 0.8  0.6 
(6) Total  100.0 100.0  100.0 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Survey of the Corporate Financial 
Environment, 2001, 2002, 2003. 
  
 
 Table 3    Mean and Median Numbers of Bank Relationships 
    2001    2002    2003  


















































































































































































(9)  Number of observations    7,204 330 7,534  7,570 450 8,020  6,821 549 7,370 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Survey of the Corporate Financial Environment, 2001, 2002, 2003. 
Notes: The values in parenthesis are median observations.    
Table 4 
Fraction of Firms that Pledge Collateral and/or Personal Guarantees 
  to Their Main Banks 
                                                               
(Percentages) 
   2001  2002  2003 
(1) Pledge  collateral  75.8  71.3  ----- 
(2)  Pledge personal guarantees  70.0  71.7  73.7 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Survey of the Corporate Financial 





















 Table 5   
Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables in Our Panel Data Set 
 
 Variables  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
(1)  Tangible assets excluding land and 
construction in progress / total assets        
 0.1814   0.1391    0.1652  
(2)  Inventories  /  total  assets                 0.1004   0.0696    0.1071  
(3)  Loans  payable  /  total  assets               0.3694   0.3509    0.2655  
(4)  Accounts  receivable-trade  /  total  assets    0.2590   0.2337    0.1766  
(5)  Accounts payable-trade / total assets      0.2146   0.1754    0.1789  
(6)  Debt-asset  ratio                        0.7036   0.7472    0.2517  
(7)  Total  assets                           4050.4   1364.7    8024.8  
(8)  Sales                                4027.3   1618.6    7271.2 
(9)  Number  of  employees                    141.6     44.0     644.5 
Units: one million yen for total assets and sales and person for number of employees. 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Survey of the Corporate Financial 













 Table 6 
Determinants of Multiple Bank Relationships (1): 
Estimation Results of the Poisson Random Effects Model and   
the Negative Binomial Random Effects Model 
Dependent variable: NBANK1 
    Poisson  Negative 
binomial 
 
Bank-firm relationship variables 








(2)  BADLOAN         -0.1208
 (-0.43)




















   -0.0002 
(-0.41) 
 
(5)  D C I T Y            0.2026 
(4.42)
***    0.1729 
 (3.72) 
*** 
(6)  D R E G I O N          0.0184 
(0.44)




(7)  DEBTR            0.6136
 (10.17)
***   0.5836 
(9.74) 
*** 















(11)  L A S S E T          0.0869 
(9.93)
***    0.0987 
 (10.78) 
*** 
(12)  ALPHA          0.2503 
(24.07)
***    
(13)  R               55.6299 
(6.31) 
*** 
(14)  S                 4.5797 
 (20.66) 
*** 
(15) Log  likelihood   
-11104.96 
 -11082.16   
(16) Number  of 
observations  
4917   4917  
Notes: ALPHA is the variance estimate of the gamma distribution of the exponential 
random effects. R and S are the parameters of the beta distribution. The coefficient 
estimates of constant, year dummies and industry dummies are suppressed. The values in 
parentheses are “t-ratios.” *,**,***  significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Table  7 
Determinants of Multiple Bank Relationships (2): 
Estimation Results of the Poisson Random Effects Model and   
the Negative Binomial Random Effects Model 
Dependent variable: NBANK2 
    Poisson   Negative 
binomial 
 
Bank-firm relationship variables 



































































(12)  ALPHA  0.2772
(24.01)
***  
(13)  R   56.7656
(5.49)
*** 
(14)  S   4.0759
(20.52)
*** 
(15) Log  likelihood -10545.66 -10529.29 
(16) Number  of  observation 4870  4870 
Notes: See the notes in Table 6 for notation.    
 Table  8 
Determinants of Personal Guarantee Pledge: 
Estimation Results of the Probit Random Effects Model   
    NBANK1  NBANK2   
Bank-firm relationship variables 





























































































(15)  Number of observation  4888  4841 
Notes: 
i u σ is the standard deviation of firm-specific error component. See the notes in 
Table 6 for the other notations.   Table 9 
Determinants of the Short-Term Interest Rate: 
Estimation Results of GLS Random Effects Model   
    NBANK1  NBANK2  
Bank-firm relationship variables 





























































































i u σ   585.2917 583.3151 
(18) 
it e σ   572.4374 574.2528 
(19)  Number of observation  4159  4139 
Notes: 
i u σ is the standard deviation of firm-specific error component, while 
it e σ is the 
standard deviation of idiosyncratic error component. See the notes in Table 6 for the 
other notations.                                                                         